





The representation  
of polysemy  
in the mental lexicon and its 
processing 
 
Yaiza Laconcha Pérez 





Supervisor: Begoña Vicente Cruz 
Academic year: 2017/2018 




Polysemy, the lexical semantic phenomenon in which a word form has different but 
related senses, is pervasive in natural languages. Examples of polysemy encompass 
regular polysemy and idiosyncratic forms, such as paper and atmosphere respectively. 
Nonetheless, regardless of its abundance in languages, it was not until 1980, with the 
appearance of cognitive grammar, that polysemy was given considerable attention. 
While this phenomenon does not seem to pose a problem in everyday communication, it 
has proved to be notably difficult to treat both theoretically and empirically (Falkum & 
Vicente, 2015, p. 3). At present, there is discussion regarding the representation of 
polysemy in the mental lexicon and its processing. The purpose of this dissertation is to 
present the main theories which are currently being discussed by linguists on this topic. 
In order to achieve this aim, I start by defining and comparing polysemy to homonymy, 
the phenomenon by which one word form has, at least, two different and unrelated 
meanings. I explain the criteria and some of the tests which can be applied to 
distinguish them (e.g. etymological derivation, native intuition, pronominalization and 
ellipsis). Moreover, I define the types in which polysemy can be subdivided, 
emphasizing metonymically and metaphorically motivated polysemy. After polysemy 
has been distinguished from homonymy and its subdivisions have been explained, I 
move on to the main section of this paper: The representation and processing of 
polysemy in the mental lexicon. The representation is the information which is stored in 
the mental lexicon for the different types of word forms. The processing is how that 
information is accessed and used in language production and comprehension. This 
being explained, I discuss what I consider to be the two main approaches regarding this 
issue. On the one hand, the theory named Sense Enumeration approach which postulates 
that the related senses of polysemous words are both stored and processed like the 
unrelated senses of homonymous terms. On the other hand, the other main theory is the 
One Representation approach, which proposes that polysemous and homonymous terms 
differ in how their meanings are stored and processed. There are various views with 
different perspectives which lie within this theory. Then, I present empirical evidence 
which partially support both theories. However, I conclude my paper by taking a stance 
for the One Representation approach.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In order to analyse and distinguish the sense or senses that a certain word may 
have, the main types of ambiguity namely, polysemy and homonymy, must be 
explained. On the one hand, polysemous words are those which are described as having 
several related senses while sharing the same word form. The noun paper can be used 
as an example, as it has got at least 2 different related meanings which are expressed in 
the following sentences: I need some paper (‘material’) and I wrote a paper (‘piece of 
work’), where the meaning of the word paper varies in both sentences but shares part of 
the meaning (in its origins, pieces of work were generally written on paper, therefore 
the senses are related in terms of the material). On the other hand, polysemy must not be 
confused with homonymy, which is the phenomenon in which two unrelated word 
senses happen to share the same phonological form. This is the case of the word form 
pupil, whose meanings differ and do not share a relation: “the dark circular opening in 
the centre of the eye that becomes smaller in bright light and larger in the dark” and “a 
person who is taught in school or privately” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of 
Current English, 1995, p. 941). In addition, it is important to mention that there are 
different forms of polysemy. On the one hand, the vast majority of polysemous words 
are what is known as conventional or regular polysemy, namely they result from lexical 
rules, for example, one can use the same word form to refer to an institution and the 
person: The school fired the teacher vs. The school will be demolished tomorrow. 
Another example of conventional polysemy can be the use of the same word form to 
refer to an animal and its meat, for example: When I was younger I used to have a 
rabbit as a pet vs. I would love to have some rabbit for dinner. On the other hand, other 
forms of polysemy are less frequent, they are idiosyncratic. Foraker and Murphy (2012) 
give as an example the following uses of the word form atmosphere: “The city’s 
atmosphere was polluted vs. The restaurant’s atmosphere was relaxed” (p. 423). 
Another example of this form of polysemy is the term good, which has a different 
(related) sense in each of the following sentences: a good novel, a good day, a good 
person, a good voice, etc. Moreover, polysemy and homonymy differ from monosemy, 
which is the case of a word form which contains a single meaning (Riemer, 2010, pp. 
168-170), such as the word form byline whose unique meaning is “a line at the 
beginning or end of an article in a newspaper, etc, giving the writer’s name.” (Oxford 
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, 1995, p. 155).  
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Moreover, according to Falkum and Vicente (2015), even though polysemy is 
much more frequent in language than homonymy, in general linguistics, not much 
attention was given to polysemy until the 1980s. This change was due to the appearance 
of cognitive grammar, where there was a high growth in the study of polysemy. 
Furthermore, ambiguity is very common in English, and when encountering an 
ambiguous word, deciding which sense is intended on each occasion is commonly not a 
problem in people’s mother tongue and very rare for somebody whose level in a second 
language is advanced. However, even though it is apparently easy to distinguish 
between the different related senses of a polysemous word, this task has proved to be 
notoriously difficult to characterise both theoretically and empirically (p. 3).  
There is currently an intense discussion regarding the way in which the related 
senses of polysemous word forms are represented in the mental lexicon and accessed in 
language use compared to the unrelated meanings of homonymous terms. It is a matter 
which has given rise to a wide variety of approaches from different perspectives. These 
different views will be described in this work, in which the aim will be to explain 
carefully the current theories in regard with how the meanings of polysemous terms are 
stored in the mental lexicon and how we process the different but related meanings of 
polysemous words in the phrasal and sentential contexts in which they occur, and also 
in the situational and discourse contexts.  
It is therefore necessary to make a distinction between the representation and the 
processing of senses. On the one hand, the representation of senses is the way in which 
they are stored, how they are structured in the mental lexicon. On the other hand, the 
processing of word senses is the act through which the representations in the mental 
lexicon are accessed, selected and combined with other meanings in the sentence. It 
deals with time-related aspects and the processing of words can take place both in 
context or out of it.  
In order to explain this complex issue, in section 2, I will distinguish in more 
detail the two main types of ambiguity mentioned previously, polysemy and 
homonymy, as well as the two further types in which polysemous words can be 
subdivided, metaphorical and metonymic polysemy. Then, in section 3, I will move on 
to defining the two main approaches regarding the way in which the senses of 
polysemous words are stored in the mental lexicon and how they are processed. Two 
principal views exist concerning this matter: The Sense Enumeration theory, according 
to which the different related senses of polysemous words and the distinct unrelated 
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senses of homonymous terms are stored equally, having all the different senses listed as 
individual representations in the mental lexicon. This view postulates that words are 
processed by choosing the right sense from a list. On the other hand, the One 
Representation approach postulates that the meanings of homonymous words are stored 
and processed differently to the senses of polysemous words. According to this theory, 
the distinct related senses of a polysemous word are stored as a single abstract sense 
which, when a polysemous word arises, gets enriched by the context (Falkum & 
Vicente, 2015, pp. 3-5). Then, in section 5, I will give experimental evidence supporting 
mainly the theory which postulates that polysemous word senses are stored and 
processed in a different way to homonymous word meanings. Finally, to conclude my 
work, I will take a stance for the One representation theory by enumerating the 
arguments in favour of it. 
 
2. Lexical ambiguity 
 
2.1 Polysemy and Homonymy 
 
Words can either have one single meaning, which is the case of monosemous 
words such as laptop, or they can be ambiguous and therefore have multiple senses. 
When talking about lexical ambiguity there are two main types of ambiguous words: 
polysemous and homonymous words. Firstly, as explained in the introduction, a 
homonymous word is a single word form that has different unrelated senses, for 
example, the word form lap can be understood as ‘circuit of a course’ or as ‘part of 
body when sitting down’ (Saeed, 2009, p 63). Secondly, according to Riemer (2010), in 
polysemy, single word forms also have multiple senses which are distinct, but they 
differ from homonymy in that the senses of polysemous terms are related (p. 135). 
Saeed (2009) explains how this is a crucial distinction for lexicographers when having 
to design dictionaries, as polysemous and homonymous senses are not listed the same 
way. Polysemous words are listed under the same lexical entry, whereas homonymous 
senses have separate entries (p. 64). An example can be given from the Oxford 
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (1995) with the polysemous word eye, where its various 
senses are listed under one lexical entry: 
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eye1 /aɪ/ n 1(a) each of the two organs on the face that are used for seeing. (b) 
the visible coloured part of this: have blue eyes. 2(a) [often pl] the power of 
seeing; the ability to see: you must have sharp eyes to be able to spot such a tiny 
detail. •  The eyes often deteriorate as one gets older. (b) [usu sing] the ability to 
make good judgements about sth one sees: To her expert eye, the painting was 
clearly a fake. • She has a good eye for a bargain. 3 a thing like an eye: the eye 
of a needle (ie the hole for the thread to go through) • a hook and eye (ie a 
fastening with a hook and loop for a dress, etc) • the eye of a potato (ie a point 
from which a shoot will grow). (p. 410). 
 
By contrast, the word lap which was mentioned above, has got different entries in the 
dictionary as a consequence of having unrelated senses: 
 
lap1 /læp/ n (a) the flat area between the stomach and knees of a person when he 
or she is sitting: come and sit on my lap. (b) the part of a dress, etc covering this: 
she gathered the fallen apples and carried them in her lap. 
lap2 /læp/ v 1 a single circuit of a track or racecourse: he crashed on the tenth 
lap. 
lap3 /læp/ v (-pp-) 1 ~ sth (up) (esp of animals) to drink sth with quick 
movements of the tongue: a dog noisily lapping (up) water. (pp. 662-663). 
 
Therefore, it could be thought that an easy way of knowing if a word is 
polysemous or homonymous is to look it up in a dictionary. Nevertheless, the 
distinction is not always so simple. Lyons (1977) explains how there are two criteria 
which have been proposed for the distinction between homonymy and polysemy.  
The first criterion has to do with the etymological derivation of words, where 
words that are historically derived from distinct lexical items are taken to be 
homonymous. In practice, nevertheless, the etymological criterion is not always certain, 
as there are many words whose historical derivation is not so clear. Furthermore, 
another reason for this uncertainty is the difficulty of knowing with any certainty how 
far back in history we should go (p. 550). 
The second criterion for the distinction between homonymy and polysemy has to 
do with meaning relatedness, which is a matter of degree and seems to be correlated 
with the native speakers’ feeling that certain meanings are connected while others are 
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not. However, in a large number of cases, there does not seem to be agreement among 
native speakers as to whether the meanings of certain words are related, which gives 
rise to the belief that there is not a clear dichotomy between homonymy and polysemy, 
but rather a continuum from ‘‘pure’’ homonymy to ‘‘pure’’ polysemy (p. 552). Saeed 
(2009) gives as an example the word form sole whose senses can either be ‘bottom of 
the foot’ or ‘flatfish’. The problem with this term is that most English speakers’ 
intuitions coincide in that these two word senses are unrelated and that they should be 
classified as homonyms and therefore given separate lexical entries in the dictionary. 
Nevertheless, they are “historically derived via French from the same Latin word solea 
‘sandal’” (p.65). This could be used as an argument to consider it a polysemous word 
regardless of general intuitions.  
Another test to differentiate between these two types of ambiguity is the 
pronominalization test, according to which if an ambiguous word can be felicitously 
pronominalized in a context in which the pronoun is an argument of a predicate and 
requires one meaning whereas its antecedent is an argument of a predicate but needs a 
different sense, then the word is considered to be polysemous. In addition, the ellipsis 
test can also be used to differ homonymy from polysemy. This test is similar to the 
pronominalization one, but instead of pronominalizing an ambiguous word, it is elided. 
To see the functioning of these tests, take the following sentences (Asher, 2011, p. 63): 
  
a. #The banki specializes in IPOs. Iti is steep and muddy and thus slippery. 
b. #The bank specializes in IPOs and is steep and muddy and thus slippery. 
 
The word form bank, found in sentences (a) and (b), is a clear example of a 
homonymous word. In sentence (a) the pronominalization test is applied and the 
sentence turns out to be anomalous. The same results are obtained in (b) from applying 
the ellipsis test. These results confirm the status of bank as a homonymous word. On the 
other hand, if the tests are applied to sentences containing word forms whose senses are 
related the results are different (Asher, 2011, p. 63): 
 
c. He paid the billi and threw iti away. 
d. Lunch was delicious but took forever.   
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In these sentences, the terms lunch and bill are polysemous, and it can be seen how 
these examples are grammatical after having applied the tests of pronominalization and 
copredication.  
Nonetheless, the following examples (e-f) demonstrate that the distinction 
between polysemy and homonymy cannot always be obtained by applying the 
pronominalization and ellipsis tests. We can see this when we apply them in other cases 
of clearly polysemous words (Asher, 2011, p. 63): 
 
 e. #The schooli finished the exam period. Iti was painted during the summer 
f. #The city outlawed smoking in bars last year and has 500,000 inhabitants. 
g. The city has 500,000 inhabitants and outlawed smoking in bars last year 
    
Sentences (e-f) contain the polysemous word forms school and city, therefore, 
according to the tests they should correct. In sentence (e), the polysemous word form 
school has got two different related senses, and it is used in the first conjunct to refer to 
‘institution’. In the second conjunct, in which the word form school is pronominalized, 
it is being used with the sense of ‘building’. However, if it is compared to (c), it can be 
appreciated how these two meanings of the word form school do not combine as 
effectively as the different senses of bill from sentence (c). Also, when comparing 
sentence (f) to (g), it can be appreciated that (f) includes the same two lexical senses of 
the word form city as (g) but the order has been changed and as a consequence the 
sentence is not completely correct. This indicates that the ellipsis test is affected by 
discourse effects, and so it is not a test that can accurately help us to identify 
polysemous words (Asher, 2011, p. 36) 
Thus, it can be concluded that distinguishing polysemy from homonymy is not 
an easy task, as the distinction is not always clear. However, in this work I will not 
focus on words whose type of ambiguity is not clear, but rather on pure polysemy and 
homonymy, that is, words whose relatedness in meaning is clear. An example of pure 
polysemy is the previously mentioned word eye which is without a doubt a polysemous 
term, unlike the example of sole given earlier, in which the relatedness of its senses 
‘bottom of the foot’ and ‘flatfish’ is not so clear to the user of the language.  
 
2.2. Varieties of polysemy  
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Now that the two main types of lexical ambiguity have been explained, there is 
another distinction which must be clarified. Cruse (2000) explains how there are 
different varieties of polysemy, he makes an important distinction between linear and 
nonlinear relations between polysemes. 
On the one hand, word senses have a linear relation when one of them is a 
specialization (a hyponym) of the other, that is to say, one of the senses is considered to 
be more basic than the other. This type of relations can be subdivided into 4 subtypes 
which will be explained briefly: Autohyponymy, Automeronymy, Autosuperordination 
and Autoholonymy.  
Firstly, Autohyponymy occurs “when a word has a default general sense, and a 
contextually restricted sense which is more specific in that it denotes a subvariety of a 
general sense.” (Cruse, 2000, p. 110). Cruse (2000) gives as an example the word drink, 
in which its general reading is exemplified in the following sentence: if you drink 
(‘liquid’) whilst you eat you will be full very easily, and the specific reading occurs in a 
sentence like I do not drink (‘alcohol’) since I had the accident two years ago (p. 111). 
Secondly, Automeronymy is similar to Autohyponymy, with the only difference 
that the more specific reading denotes a subpart rather than a subtype. The word door is 
given as an example, in which it can mean either the whole door, as in the sentence go 
through that door, or it can just mean the leaf, as exemplified in take the door of its 
hinges (Cruse, 2000, p. 111). 
Furthermore, in Autosuperordination, the specific sense is taken to cover a 
general example as a result of the lexical gap existing for general senses. Cruse (2000) 
explains how this can be reflected in the word man, referring to the human race 
including the female members. He also gives the example of cow to refer to bovines of 
both sexes (Cruse, 2000, p. 111). 
Finally, the fourth type, namely Autoholonymy, can be explained with the word 
hand, whose meaning may include the hand or not. In the sentence He lost an arm in the 
accident the whole arm is included, whereas in a scratch on the arm, it is clearly 
referring to the non-hand part of the arm (Cruse, 2000, p. 111). 
On the other hand, the non-linear relations between polysemes result from two 
basic semantic phenomena: metaphor and metonymy. Firstly, as Klepousniotou, Pike, 
Steinhauer and Gracco (2012) explain, in the type of polysemy motivated by metaphor 
‘a relation of analogy is assumed to hold between the senses, the basic sense is literal, 
whereas the secondary sense was originally figurative when this use of the word 
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emerged’ (p. 11). An example of this is the polysemous word eye, which was previously 
mentioned and which has, on the one hand, the basic and literal sense “each of the two 
organs on the face that are used for seeing” and on the other hand, the secondary 
figurative sense “hole in a needle” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current 
English, 1995, p. 410). Moreover, in metonymic polysemy there is an interrelation 
between closely associated terms, and in it, both senses, the primary and the secondary 
meanings, are literal and the relation between the senses is of some sort of association 
(Klepousniotou et al., 2012, p. 12). For example, the polysemous word chicken has got 
the literal primary sense ‘animal’ and the second literal sense ‘meat of the animal’, and 
both of them are related; another example is the word form paper, which contains the 
literal primary sense ‘material’ and the second literal sense ‘content’. 
Therefore, metaphorical and metonymic polysemy differ in that in the former, 
one of the senses is literal and the other is figurative, while, in the latter, both senses are 
literal. Also, in metaphorical polysemy the relation between both senses is of analogy 
and in metonymic polysemy, the relation is of some form of association.  
 
3. Storage and processing in the mental lexicon  
  
When using a language, there seems to be hardly any problems when having to 
decide which sense is being used in which context when lexically ambiguous words are 
used. However, the study of polysemy has proved to be notoriously difficult to approach 
and, in this section, the different views concerning this complex issue will be explained. 
The difficulty does not lie in homonymy, but in how the different related senses of 
polysemous words are stored and processed in the mental lexicon.  
The question that arises is whether the senses of polysemous and homonymous 
words are represented in the mental lexicon and processed equally or if they operate in a 
different way. In this section, I will go through all the different hypotheses that exist 




In homonymy, as I mentioned previously, there is not much discussion as there 
is one main hypothesis which prevails and with which there seems to be no problems. 
The consensus is that all the different senses of a homonymous word have separate 
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mental ‘entries’ or representations in the mental lexicon, namely, there is a distinct 
representation for each sense of a homonymous word. When encountering a 
homonymous word, all the senses which are listed in the mental lexicon are activated at 
a first stage, then, hearers process it by selecting one of these senses out of all the 
possibilities (Falkum & Vicente, 2015, p. 3). So, if someone utters the sentence I cannot 
wait to see that new play, in which the word play is homonymous, the different senses 
which are stored in the hearer’s mental lexicon (i.e. ‘performance’ and ‘activity’) will 
be activated and the word will be processed by choosing the most appropriate sense in 
the particular sentential context, in this case the sense of ‘performance’. Thus, the 
resolution of the ambiguity involves competition between senses. 
Frisson (2009) explains how the frequency of the senses and the preceding 
contextual information have a significant influence when processing a homonymous 
word. In a case in which there is no contextual information, “both meanings receive 
low-level activation when the word is encountered, with the most frequent or dominant 
meaning reaching threshold faster (i.e., becoming available to the processor)” (p. 113). 
However, with equi-biased homonyms (both meanings are equally frequent), both 
senses get the same level of activation and are equally available. On the other hand, in 
the cases in which there is preceding contextual information, if the frequency of both 
meanings is equal, the context can give rise to the priming of the intended meaning so 
that it can be threshold faster. When the intended meaning is less frequent, contextual 
support will make both the intended and the most frequent meaning reach threshold (p. 
113).  
 Furthermore, Frisson (2009) also explains why reaching the subordinate 
meaning of a homonymous word is generally more difficult. He explains the 
subordinate bias effect, according to which, when the intended meaning in a context is 
the subordinate sense, extra processing is observed. This extra processing occurs 
because at first, the most dominant sense is selected and then the preceding context 
indicates that the dominant sense which was selected is not the intended one. There is 
then a competition between the two senses before the intended one is selected (p. 114). 
The homonymous word form pupil, which was mentioned in the introduction, can be 
used as an example. If someone utters the following sentence: The teacher pointed at 
the pupil and explained what its function in the eye is, what will occur is that because of 
the context in which the word form is, the hearer will not access the subordinate 
meaning (‘eye’) which is intended immediately, he/she will first select the most 
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frequent sense (‘student’). As this sense does not fit the sentential context, there will be 




Moving on to polysemy, as explained in the introduction, even though polysemy 
is a very common phenomenon, it was not until 1980s that it was given attention as a 
matter of study thanks to the appearance of cognitive grammar. Unlike in homonymy, 
the representation and processing of related senses in the mental lexicon has turned out 
to be a very controversial topic (Falkum & Vicente, 2015, p. 3). As mentioned 
previously, there are currently two main theories which are being discussed  
Firstly, one of the theories, the Sense Enumeration hypothesis, explains that the 
different but related senses of polysemous words are stored and generated the same way 
as the unrelated senses of homonymous words, that is, having a separate representation 
in the mental lexicon for each sense and selecting one of the meanings from within the 
list associated with that word form. On the other hand, the other main theory, the One 
Representation hypothesis, claims that polysemous words are represented and processed 
in a different way, having only an underspecified representation for each word form. 
According to this approach, when a polysemous word is encountered, the new senses 
are generated from the single representation which is found in the mental lexicon, as we 
will see in more detail in the next section. (Falkum & Vicente, 2015, pp. 3-5). 
 
3.2.1. The Sense Enumeration hypothesis   
 
The Sense Enumeration hypothesis is a monomorphic model in which the 
distinction between polysemy and homonymy is highly attenuated, as related and 
unrelated senses are stored and processed the same way. According to this theory, both 
the related and unrelated senses of polysemous and homonymous word forms are stored 
as distinct representations and the speakers and hearers have to select one of these fully 
specified senses out of a list. In this theory, words are assumed to be understood by 
selecting their intended sense from an exhaustive list of potential senses which are 
stored in the mental lexicon (Falkum and Vicente, 2015, p. 3-4). Therefore, SELs 
(Sense Enumeration Lexicons) make two assumptions: They believe that all senses for 
each polysemous word form are established in the mental lexicon separately; also, that 
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the intended meaning is selected from these senses when required, which is the standard 
way lexicographers put dictionaries together (Klepousniotou, 2001, p. 207).  
This approach is the one with the least empirical support due to its limitations. 
Firstly, as Klepousniotou (2001) explains, there is a parsimony problem as a result of 
having a different representation for each sense of a word form, which ends up being an 
extremely uneconomical lexicon where each sense has to be stored separately ending up 
with a long list of senses. To clarify this limitation, Klepousniotou (2001) gives as an 
example the word sad, which can be used in multiple ways: a sad novel, a sad day or a 
sad child, and many others. In each of these examples sad has a slightly different 
meaning, and according to SELs, there is a separate representation for each of these 
senses in our mental lexicon. Secondly, the fact that the senses of a polysemous 
expression are related does not make a difference if all the different senses are stored as 
the distinct, unrelated meanings of homonymous words. Finally, another important 
problem of this approach is that it cannot explain how it is possible that creative new 
senses which are used in novel contexts and that are not listed can nevertheless be 
understood without a problem (p. 208). Apart from these problems, in the fourth section 
I will give some empirical evidence in which this approach is not supported.   
 
3.2.2. The One Representation hypothesis 
 
The other main alternative to the Sense Enumeration hypothesis and the most 
popular theory is the One Representation hypothesis. According to this proposal, the 
mental lexicon is not a fixed list of word senses where everything is stored, it is a 
generator of new senses (Klepousniotou, 2001, p. 208). Thus, the different senses of a 
polysemous word form depend on a single representation that is stored in the mental 
lexicon which is abstract and underspecified.  
Moreover, moving on to the processing of related senses, according to this 
theory when a polysemous word is encountered, the general belief is that the extended 
senses are generated from the single sense which is stored in the mental lexicon, taking 
into account the sentential and situational context (Falkum & Vicente, 2015, p. 5). 
Therefore, if someone utters the term school, an underspecified sense will be accessed 
and the adequate sense for that specific occasion will be constructed in the sentential or 
situational context in which it appears. 
	 12 	
Therefore, according to the One Representation hypothesis, only an abstract 
sense of the word is stored in the lexicon. Extended senses are created when required in 
context, making it a much more economic approach than the sense enumeration theory. 
Also, as mentioned previously, this hypothesis has got the most supporters and 
according to it, homonymy and polysemy are processed differently. To sum up, a 
simple explanation for the Sense Enumeration approach and the One Representation 
theory can be the following: 
 
• The Sense Enumeration approach claims that the meanings of all ambiguous 
words are stored and processed similarly. In a sense enumeration lexicon all the 
related senses of a polysemous word are stored in the mental lexicon as separate 
representations. 
• The One Representation hypothesis makes a clear distinction between the 
representation and processing of homonymous and polysemous words. In this 
approach, polysemous words only have an underspecified sense stored in the 
mental lexicon, which gets built and enriched in context.  
 
There are different theories which are included within this latter approach, and I 
will focus on the Generative Lexicon hypothesis of Pustejovsky (1995) and the Core 
Meaning hypothesis. The main difference between these proposals is whether they 
involve ‘rich’ or ‘thin’ semantics, with Pustejovsky’s proposal illustrating the former 
and the Core Meaning approach the latter (Falkum and Vicente, 2015, p. 5). 
 
3.2.2.1. Rich semantics 
 
The rich semantics version of the one representation hypothesis, which was 
proposed by Pustejovsky (1995), assumes that the lexical meanings that are stored in the 
mental lexicon are rich in conceptual information and that hearers select only a part of 
the whole informational content provided by lexical meaning. Pustejovsky (1995) 
creates the Generative Lexicon theory and claims to have created this approach “to 
provide a formal statement of language that is both expressive and flexible enough to 
capture the generative nature of lexical creativity and sense extension phenomena” 
(p.61). His aim is to give a formal account of conventional polysemy (Falkum, 2007, p. 
205). In order to do this, he proposes a complex generative lexicon which acts as a 
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computational system composed of a structure with four levels of representation 
(Pustejovsky, 1995, p. 61):  
 
● Argument structure: Specification of the number and nature of the arguments to 
a predicate. 
● Event structure: Definition of the event type of the expression and any 
subeventual structure it may have. 
● Qualia structure: Modes of explanation associated with a word or phrase.  
● Lexical inheritance structure: Identification of how a lexical structure is related 
to other structures. 
    
To account for how different senses of a word are composed in sentence 
comprehension, it is the information in the qualia structure that is most important. In 
order to explain what a lexical item means, a series of properties are given. These 
include information about what kind of object it is, what makes it different within a 
larger area (formal role); what it is used for, its function (telic role); what it is 
constituted of (constitutive role) and how the object was created, its origin (agentive 
role) (Falkum, 2007, p. 210): 
     
 
ARGSTR ARG1= x 
      …  
                        
 
                       CONST = what x is made of 
QUALIA        FORMAL = what x is 
TELIC = function of x 
AGENTIVE = how x came into being  
      
 
For a common, non-relational noun, such as ‘book’, the Argument and Qualia 
structure would give us the following richly structured representation (Falkum, 2007, p. 
213):        




ARGSTR ARG1= x: physical object 
                        ARG2= y: information 
 
 
QUALIA        information / physical object 
FORMAL = hold (x,y) 
TELIC = read event (e), where an agent (w) reads the information (y) 
that the object (x) holds 
AGENTIVE = write (event of writing (e) of the information (y) 
contained in the book (x) by an agent (w). 
      
 
This way we have two different lexical senses clustered into one lexical entry. 
Very roughly, in the process of composing the meaning of each of the two sentences 
below, the sense that fits in with the semantics of the verb (and its other arguments) will 
be selected (Falkum, 2007, p. 212): 
 
h. The book is sitting on the coffee table (‘book’ = physical object, as ‘sitting’ is 
predicated of physical objects); 
i. Mary found the book interesting (‘book’ Informational object, as reading 
invokes the telic role of ‘book’). 
 
We might consider the inclusion of rule-based approaches in this category, as 
another view of the rich semantics version of the One Representation hypothesis. 
According to this idea, in order to process a polysemous expression, a literal sense is 
accessed first and then a conventional linguistic rule is applied which takes the hearer to 
another sense of that same polysemous expression if necessary. The supporters of this 
kind of approach assert that to explain the productivity of polysemy, lexical rules are 
necessary. This rule-based approach can be explained with the following analysis of the 
‘statue’ case carried out by Jackendoff (1992): Imagine that we are in a wax museum 
and we are looking at the recreation of the Beatles and someone says Ringo is the Beatle 
that I like the most wanting to communicate ‘Ringo is the wax figure that I like the 
most’. Jackendoff (1992) explains how there is a linguistic rule that makes this 
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interpretation possible which is that “any NP can stand for an object or for a physical 
representation of that object” (as cited in Falkum and Vicente, 2015, p. 8). So, there is 
on the one hand a literal sense ‘Ringo the artist’ and then the other non-literal sense ‘the 
statue of Ringo’ which is obtained through a linguistic rule. However, the rule-based 
approaches are limited to some extent, as they are not able to account for a wide range 
of polysemy phenomena and they do not permit much flexibility of interpretation. They 
only work for highly conventionalised cases of regular polysemy, the typical example 
being the count mass interpretation of polysemous words such as rabbit with its 
‘animal’ and ‘meat’ senses (Falkum & Vicente, 2015, p. 8). 
To sum up, the basic idea of rich semantics is that the mental lexicon is not rigid 
structure but rather creative and generative. The Generative Lexicon theory claims that 
the lexical meanings that are stored in the mental lexicon are rich in conceptual 
information. Then, when having to process a polysemous word, the hearers select only 
that part of the whole informational content that allows a coherent interpretation of the 
sentence. The other view, the rule-based approaches postulate that the senses stored in 
the mental lexicon are literal and in order to access a derived sense, a linguistic rule is 
used. Therefore, both of them are in agreement with the one representation hypothesis, 
the different related senses are not listed in the lexicon but rather generated, either by 
selecting from the informational content which is stored or through applying linguistic 
rules to what is stored in the mental lexicon. 
 
3.2.2.2. Thin semantics 
 
Thin semantics is the idea that “lexical or standing meanings of words are 
impoverished with respect to their occasional meanings” (Falkum and Vicente, 2015, p. 
6). Unlike in the rich semantics version of the One Representation hypothesis, the thin 
semantics view asserts that the information stored in the lexicon for a polysemous word 
is not rich in conceptual information, but rather an abstract core meaning. According to 
this theory, if a polysemous word is encountered with no biasing context, then the core 
meaning which is stored in the mental lexicon can be recalled so that the hearer gets a 
general idea of the intended meaning, and then, the information in the sentence or 
situational context, will help to understand the specific sense intended. One problem 
with this view is that as mentioned previously, some senses of polysemous words do not 
have many semantic features in common. The polysemous word form church can be 
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used as an example: If someone finds the word church in a neutral context, it does not 
seem possible to recall a core meaning which includes both ‘the building’ and ‘the 
organization’ senses, as they hardly have any features in common (Foraker & Murphy, 
2012, p. 408). 
This kind of approach is adopted in lexical pragmatics, where it is assumed that 
after activation of the encoded (abstract) meaning of the lexical item, additional 
inference is required to get to the intended meaning. This is because according to this 
kind of approach, word senses experience pragmatic modulation while the process of 
interpreting the utterance is taking place. To clarify the process, take the following 
example: (1) David is a snake, meaning ‘treacherous person'. The interpretation in (1) 
could not be produced merely by linguistic context, it requires the presence of a 
situational context, with which, its interpretation can be effortlessly inferred. Therefore, 
the hearer, through the context derives the speaker's intended meaning (Falkum & 
Vicente, 2015, p. 10). 
      
4. Experimental evidence  
      
After having explained what I consider to be the main approaches regarding the 
representation of polysemy in the mental lexicon, I will now move on to giving real data 
on this topic. Currently, there is an ongoing debate on empirical studies in the literature 
regarding the topic discussed in this work. In this section, I will give some evidence of 
numerous studies which support the One Representation hypothesis, by showing some 
facts in favour of the idea that the senses of polysemous words, unlike the meanings of 
homonymous words, are stored in the mental lexicon in a single ‘entry’, whether 
general or rich. Nevertheless, I will also describe a study in which the alternative, the 
Sense Enumeration approach, is supported. In addition, I will explain in detail a study 
whose results have implications for both theories. 
There are several studies which suggest that homonymous and polysemous 
words are represented and processed differently. The following studies are only a few 
examples among the numerous studies which support this theory. Frazier and Rayner 
(1990) found in their study that participants’ eye movement were different for 
polysemous and homonymous words, as polysemous words required shorter fixation 
times (the period of time when the eyes remain relatively still) while reading the 
sentences presented. In their study, the subjects had to read the sentences presented and 
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their eye’s movement were tracked. At first, 10 warm up sentences were presented and 
then they read the experimental sentences. Frazier and Rayner (1990) explain how 
because the meanings of homonymous words are mutually exclusive, the selection of 
the intended meaning must occur before interpretation takes place. The contrary occurs 
with polysemous words, as they are not mutually exclusive, and taking into account the 
One Representation view, the underspecified meaning remains activated so that 
selection and disambiguation is delayed if it is necessary (as cited in Klepousniotou et 
al., 2012, p 12).  
Moreover, the experiment carried out by Klepousniotou et al. (2012) can also be 
used as behavioural evidence for the distinction between homonymy and polysemy, and 
so in favour of the One Representation hypothesis. In their work, they observed the 
temporal patterns of meaning activation of homonymy and polysemy in order to provide 
evidence on the way in which words with multiple meanings are processed and 
represented in the mental lexicon. The data reported in this study was focused on the 
N400 1  component of the event-related potentials (ERP) 2 . It was found that for 
homonymous words predominantly dominant targets showed reduced N400 amplitudes, 
indicating effects of frequency. In contrast, for polysemous words, it was found that 
both dominant and subordinate related targets showed reduced N400 effects to unrelated 
targets, providing evident that supports the One Representation hypothesis. (pp. 14-19) 
On the other hand, in contrast with the notion that homonymy and polysemy are 
represented and processed differently, there are a number of studies which support the 
Sense Enumeration approach, where polysemy is processed just like homonymy. In 
particular, a study carried out by Klein and Murphy (2001) found no evidence that 
polysemous terms placed in phrasal contexts (e.g., monthly paper vs. crumpled paper) 
function differently from homonymous words. The results on the first study showed that 
“contextual consistency facilitated comprehension while contextual inconsistency 
inhibited comprehension” (as cited in Klepousniotou et al., 2012, p. 12). Therefore, 																																																								
1 An Electrophysiological measure in the brain linked to meaning processing, which is determined by its 
characteristic morphology and change in amplitude relative to deviant or unexpected stimuli (Ravobsky 
& McRae, 2012) 
2 “time-locked measure of electrical activity of the cerebral surface representing a distinct phase of 
cortical processing […] provides online information about neurophysiological processes related to a range 
of cognitive tasks […] they reflect the processing of information millisecond by millisecond” (Somani & 
Shukla, 2014, p. 33)  
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based on the results of this study, the Sense Enumeration view is supported, namely, the 
related senses of polysemous words are stored like the unrelated senses of homonymous 
words, having separate representations for each sense.  
In addition, there are other experiments whose results have implications for 
various theories. That is the case of the study carried out by Brown (2008), which I will 
explain in detail. For this study, she used 4 groups of materials in which each contained 
11 pairs of phrases and each phrase in a pair contained the same verb. The groups she 
used are the following (p.5):  
 
1. Unrelated (homonymy)      
2. Distantly related senses (polysemy) 
3. Closely related senses (polysemy) 
4. Same senses  
 
In these four conditions, in order to balance the stimuli, there were pairs containing 
anomalous (noncoherent) phrases. She gives as an example for each category the 
following pairs of sentences (Brown, 2008, p. 5):  
 
Homonymy    banked the plane and banked the money 
Distantly related senses  ran the track and ran the shop 
Closely related senses  broke the glass and broke the radio  
Same senses    cleaned the shirt and cleaned the cup  
 
Moving on to the procedure, every participant saw the 11 pairs found in each of 
the 4 groups, using “a one-way repeated measures3 design” (Brown, 2008, p. 6). They 
saw the material on a screen and they were asked to press yes or no. Participants had to 
press yes when they considered a sentence to be coherent, and no when the sentence 
was anomalous. They were asked to answer all sentences (prime and target). The correct 
answer to all target phrases was yes, as they were all semantically coherent. The 
response time and accuracy in answering target sentences was measured but it was not 
measured for noncoherent pairs of sentences, as they were only added as “foils to the 																																																								
3  A comparison of the means of three or more matched groups, it only applies when treatments are given 
repeatedly to each subject (Keppel & Wickens, 2004) 
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test pairs to encourage participants to fully access the meaning of all phrases” (p. 6)
 In the results, there was a big difference between the 4 categories regarding 
response times and accuracy of the answers. If the response times are compared 
between the group of “same sense” pairs and all the other groups, there was an 
important difference, showing quicker response times when the pairs were of the same 
sense. Moreover, in the same sense pairs there was also a higher accuracy, with a 95.6% 
correct for same sense mean and 78% the other groups. Therefore, when having to 
move from one sentence to another, if the meaning was the same, the subjects were 
faster in deciding than when they encountered sentences with different meanings, 
regardless of whether they were related or not. Furthermore, moving from one sentence 
to another when the senses were closely related was faster and more accurate than 
moving between distantly related senses and unrelated senses. There was also a 
distinction in the response times and accuracy between distantly related and unrelated 
pairs, with 81% correct for distantly related pairs and 62% in the unrelated sentences. 
Thus, it can be appreciated that there is an advantage in processing related senses of 
polysemous words. Thus, the more closely related in meaning the more easily processed 
(pp. 6-7). 
Looking at the comparison between the same sense pairs and the other groups, it 
could be said that these results support the Sense Enumeration hypothesis, that is, that 
all ambiguous words are stored and processed equally. As the study shows “same sense 
pairs strongly facilitated compared to all different sense pairs” (Brown, 2008, p. 8). 
However, the results obtained from this comparison do not exclude the possibility of 
having a single representation in the mental lexicon for related senses. Moreover, the 
Sense Enumeration theory would predict distantly related and closely related pairs to 
have similar response times and accuracy. Nevertheless, this is not the case, the results 
show that closely related pairs were accessed more quickly and accurately than distantly 
related pairs. In addition, the big difference between distantly related senses and 
homonyms obtained in the results is also compatible with the One Representation view, 
as it shows that accessing completely separate representations is a slower and less 
accurate process than accessing senses which share a single lexical entry. Therefore, 
even though Brown considers that the results are not conclusive, they are nevertheless 
compatible with the One Representation hypothesis (pp. 8-9).  
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5. Conclusion  
 
 In this paper I have tried to account for the main views regarding the 
representation of polysemy in the mental lexicon and the way in which it is processed, 
by comparing it to homonymy. It is a complex issue to treat theoretically and thus, 
many theories are still being discussed and no consensus has been reached yet.  
I have explained how one of the main views is the Sense Enumeration approach, 
according to which all the different senses of polysemous terms are represented in the 
mental lexicon as separate entries. These senses are processed by selecting the intended 
meaning among the different senses which are stored in the lexicon. Therefore, 
polysemy and homonymy are treated equally, as both related and unrelated senses are 
stored and processed the same way. The other main theory, the One Representation 
approach, postulates the opposite view, that is, the senses of polysemous and 
homonymous terms are stored and processed differently. According to this theory, the 
different but related senses of a polysemous term are represented in the mental lexicon 
as a single entry which may be richly structured or very general. This view asserts that 
when having to process a polysemous word, the intended sense is generated from the 
single sense which is stored in the mental lexicon, taking into account the sentential and 
situational context. In addition, I have enumerated and briefly defined the theories 
which are compatible with the One Representation approach. These views are the 
Generative Lexicon hypothesis of Pustejovsky (and possibly rule-based approaches) and 
the Core Meaning hypothesis, which differ in whether they involve ‘rich’ or ‘thin’ 
semantics. 
On the one hand, in the rich semantics version of the One Representation 
approach lie the Generative Lexicon hypothesis and rule-based approaches. The 
Generative Lexicon hypothesis believes what is stored in the mental lexicon to be rich 
in conceptual information. According to this view, in order to obtain one of the senses 
of a polysemous word, only a part of the whole informational content which is 
represented in the lexicon is selected. When the word is used in a sentence, that part 
which is needed to construct the meaning of the whole sentence is accessed and 
combined with the rest of the content of the sentence.  
On the other hand, thin semantics is the One Representation version which 
explains that what is represented in the lexicon is not rich in conceptual information but 
very schematic and general. The Core Meaning hypothesis claims that what is stored is 
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an abstract core meaning that is shared by all the different senses of a polysemous word, 
and that it is through contextual inference that we arrive at the specific senses intended. 
After having defined the main views and explained some empirical studies 
which have been carried out, I can affirm that I believe the One Representation 
approach to be the theory which accounts for the representation and processing of 
polysemy more accurately. I consider the Sense Enumeration approach to be a theory 
with too many limitations: As a consequence of having all the different senses stored, it 
ends up being a highly uneconomical lexicon; also, the fact that the senses of 
polysemous expressions are related does not make a difference here if the senses of 
homonymous and polysemous expressions are stored and processed equally; finally, it 
is a problem how we can understand without a problem creative new senses which are 
used in novel contexts that are not listed. Therefore, I agree with the idea that the related 
senses of a polysemous word form are stored in the mental lexicon as a unique entry, 
unlike the unrelated senses of homonymous terms which are stored in the lexicon as 
separate representations. However, even though I found enough information and 
empirical evidence to believe the One Representation theory to be the valid one, I 
cannot take a stance for the rich or thin semantics version of this theory. It is an issue 
for which not many empirical studies have been carried out and it is a matter that is still 
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